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INTERGOVERNMENTAL ZONING
IMMUNITY: TIME FOR A NEW
TEST?
City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills'
The City of Kirkwood (Kirkwood) engaged in negotiations with the
private owners of property located within the city limits of the City of
Sunset Hills (Sunset Hills) for the purpose of acquiring the property for use
as a public swimming pool and recreational facility. Two days before
Kirkwood was to pass an ordinance authorizing the purchase, the Sunset
Hills Board of Aldermen passed an ordinance which prohibited the crea-
tion, maintenance, or operation of any public recreational facility or
swimming pool within the city, except by the city itself. 2
Upon delivery of this ordinance to Kirkwood officials, Kirkwood in-
stituted a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for St. Louis
County, Missouri, to contest the validity of the Sunset Hills ordinance and
to determine Kirkwood's rights were it to purchase the property in ques-
tion.3 The court held that Kirkwood had the authority under Missouri
Revised Statutes section 90.010 to acquire the property located in Sunset
Hills for the purposes specified in the statute. The Sunset Hills ordinance
was not, however, held invalid,4 and Kirkwood was not reassured as to its
control of the property if acquired.
Nevertheless, Kirkwood proceeded to purchase the property, closing
the sale in February of 1978. Sunset Hills responded by seeking injunctive
relief to prohibit Kirkwood from proceeding with its plans to open the
pool. The trial court, taking judicial notice of the file in the prior
1. 589 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979).
2. Sunset Hills officials were aware of Kirkwood's intent to purchase the
property and had, in fact, discussed the possibility of joint purchase and use of the
property with Kirkwood. Id. at 33. Negotiations will not generally be grounds for
justifiable reliance, and promissory estoppel was not argued in Kirkwood. For a
discussion of the applicability of the promissory estoppel theory in a similar case,
see South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 741 n.1, 591
P.2d 877, 879 n.1 (1979) (county denied city unclassified use permit after giving
initial approval).
3. Kirkwood claimed the authority to buy and use the land for park pur-
poses under two Missouri statutes. "The council may . . . purchase and hold
grounds for public parks within the city, or within three miles thereof." RSMO §
77.140 (1969) (now 1978). "Whenever any city desires to establish a park or
pleasure grounds, the common council or mayor and board of alderrmen of such
city is hereby authorized and empowered to acquire property for such purposes by
gift, purchase or condemnation of lands in such city or within one mile
thereof. . . ." RSMO § 90.010 (1969) (now 1978). 589 S.W.2d at 33.
4. 589 S.W.2d at 34.
1
Weedin: Weedin: Intergovernmental Zoning Immunity:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
1981] RECENT CASES
declaratory judgment action, permanently enjoined Kirkwood from
creating, maintaining, or operating a public recreational facility or public
swimming pool on the property. 5
On appeal of both the declaratory judgment and permanent injunc-
tion, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District dissolved the
injunction against Kirkwood and held that the Sunset Hills ordinance
could not be employed to prohibit the operation by Kirkwood of its public
swimming pool or recreational facility.6 The holding was based on the
ground that the ordinance was invalid insofar as it conflicted with the city's
legislatively delegated power to acquire land by condemnation for use as a
recreational facility.7 In reaching its decision, the court of appeals re-
viewed Missouri law on governmental immunity from zoning regulations
and suggested that the balancing of public interests test presently
employed by a number of jurisdictions8 is the best method for resolving in-
tergovernmental conflicts of this sort. The court of appeals declined to ap-
ply the balancing of public interests test in Kirkwood, however, because
there was no precedent in Missouri for doing so, and because neither party
requested that it do so. 9
To date the Missouri cases fail to reveal adoption of any one of the
several approaches 10 courts have developed to analyze situations in which
one governmental unit (intruding unit) seeks immunity from another
governmental unit's (host unit's) land use regulations.' The recurrent
5. Id.
6. Id. at 43.
7. Although the court did not expressly say so, it appears that its decision
was based on the power of eminent domain test. See note 12 and accompanying
text infra.
8. See generally City of Newark v. University of Del., 304 A.2d 347 (Del.
Ch. 1973); City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
Inc., 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), affd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976);
Kunimoto v. Kawakami, 56 Hawaii 582, 545 P.2d 684 (1976) (suggests adoption
of the test in dictum); Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan.
App. 2d 102, 576 P.2d 230 (1978); Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293
Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426 (1972); Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697
(1972); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694 (N.D. 1977); City
of Pittsburgv. Commonwealth, 468 Pa. 174, 360 A.2d 607 (1976); Lincoln County
v. Johnson, - S.D. __, 257 N.W.2d 453 (1977).
9. 589 S.W.2d at 43.
10. For a general criticism and discussion of the traditional methods of
analysis, see Note, Governmental Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84
HARV. L. REV. 869, 869-83 (1971); Comment, The Inapplicability of Municipal
Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Uses, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 698,
700-07 (1968). See generally Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 970 (1958).
11. The Kirkwood court raised a possible distinction to be made between
zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to RSMo ch. 89 (1969) and the city's general
police powers. 589 S.W.2d at 36 n.3. Whether characterizing Sunset Hills'
authority as police power arising from RSMO §§ 79.450-.470 (1969) (now 1978),
2
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modes of analysis are the power of eminent domain test,' 2 statutory
guidance test,1s governmental/proprietary distinction test,' 4 superior
sovereign test,' 5 and the more recently developed balancing of public in-
terests test.' 6 The Kirkwood court acknowledged the apparent confusion
in Missouri decisional law, but suggested that if one of the parties could
trace its authority to the Missouri Constitution, Missouri courts will
generally hold that it takes precedence over a power not so grounded. 7 An
examination of the cases illustrates that when the zoning power of one
governmental entity comes into conflict with the condemnation power of
another governmental entity, Missouri courts have looked to the authority
behind the respective powers to determine which should prevail. This
statement is of dubious value, however, since where there are conflicting
authorities, a court will naturally seek the superior source. This is in
essence the analysis behind each of the traditional tests.
rather than a zoning ordinance would have changed the court's approach or
analysis of the case is left unclear, but the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District in State ex rel. City of Gower v. Gee, 573 S.W.2d 107, 108 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1978), reached the same conclusion by addressing the conflict as one
between two governmental bodies in the exercise of their police powers. See text
accompanying notes 39 & 40 infra.
12. "The rationale is that eminent domain is a natural power of the
sovereign limited only by constitutional provisions, whereas the police powers
which are the source of zoning authority arise from constitutional grant and
statutory enactment." Lincoln County v. Johnson, - S.D. -, -, 257
N.W.2d 453, 456 (1977) (paraphrasing City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90
Ariz. 393, 397, 368 P.2d 637, 638 (1962)). For a succinct criticism of this test, see
Comment, Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental Land Use, 39
TEX. L. REV. 316, 317-18 (1961).
13. When the legislature anticipates possible governmental conflicts of this
sort and establishes priorities in the statutes, the problem becomes one of
statutory interpretation and applicability. See Reber v. South Lakewood Sanita-
tion Dist., 147 Colo. 70, 75, 362 P.2d 877, 879 (1961).
14. The governmental/proprietary distinction arises from tort law, as a
device for limiting the effect of governmental immunity from tort liability. See
Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 1244, 1254-55 (1974).
15. "[W]here the immunity from local zoning regulation is claimed by any
agency or authority which occupies a superior position in the governmental
hierarchy, the presumption is that such immunity was intended in the absence of
express statutory language to the contrary." Aviation Servs. v. Board of Adjust-
ment, 20 N.J. 275, 282, 119 A.2d 761, 765 (1956).
16. The balancing of public interests test was first suggested in Note, supra
note 10, at 883-86. See also Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 NJ. 142, 153, 286 A.2d 697,
702-03 (1972).
17. 589 S.W.2d at 42. See generally Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451
S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1970); State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo.
1960); State ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. En
Banc 1957); State ex rel. City of Gower v. Gee, 573 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. App., K.C.
1978). See also Annot., supra note 14, at 1249.
[Vol. 46462
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Missouri cases prior to Kirkwood where the zoning power of one
governmental entity conflicted with an exercise of power by another
governmental entity are not numerous. In one of the earlier cases, State ex
rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss," the City of Ladue intervened in
an action brought by private citizens seeking to prohibit the court from
entertaining a condemnation action brought by the Ladue School District
which sought residentially zoned land for school purposes. 1 9 In basing its
decision on the school district's power of eminent domain, the Missouri
Supreme Court relied on both constitutional and statutory authority.2 0
The court held that the municipal zoning ordinance could not restrict a
school district in its selection of a site for a public school where the school
district was using its eminent domain power. It was found that the school
district had superior statutory authority which was derived directly from
the constitutional grant of eminent domain power. The practical conse-
quences of holding otherwise were also noted.21
In State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp,2 2 private landowners living in Jackson
County brought a proceeding in certiorari to challenge the county's ap-
proval of Raytown's application for authority to build a sewage disposal
plant there, alleging that such building was prohibited by county zoning
laws. The supreme court declined to apply the governmental/proprietary
test28 and instead looked to the "legislative intent and design in granting to
cities the power to acquire sewage disposal plants. ' 24 The county's zoning
18. 304 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. En Banc 1957).
19. Ferriss is discussed in Comment, The Missouri Municipality's Power to
Zone Public and Quasi-Public Uses, 26 Mo. L. REV. 45, 45-46 (1961).
20. The court cited in the school district's favor Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a)
(amended 1976) and RSMO §§ 165.100, .370 (1949) (current versions at RSMO
§§ 177.041, .091, .131, .141 (1978)). The court traced the zoning power to RSMO
§ 89.020 (1949) (now 1978), which states in part: "For the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the community, the legislative
body of all cities, towns, and villages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict
... the location and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry,
residence or other purposes." The court held that the words "trade," "industry,"
and "residence" relate to private property only and the phrase "other purposes"
was "not to be broadened to include a public use of property by the state in carry-
ing out its constitutional mandate to establish and maintain free public schools."
304 S.W.2d at 900.
21. "Obviously, if the nine cities within the school district had the power to
restrict the location of schools, it would become a practical impossibility for the
school district to establish school wards and locate schools therein." 304 S.W.2d
at 901.
22. 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
23. Id. at 890.
24. Id. at 887. The court relied on MO. CONST. art. IV, § 37 (amended
1976) and RSMO §§ 71.680, 79.380 (1949) (now 1978), as the city's constitutional
and statutory sources of authority.
1981]
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authority lay in Missouri Revised Statutes section 64.090. 25 The court,
however, rested its holding on the legislative intent expressed by the grant
of the power of eminent domain to the city. 26 The existence of the right to
condemn, even though it was not exercised in Askew, was found to be
determinative and Raytown's power to build a sewage disposal plant was
upheld."
The zoning laws of St. Louis County were upheld against Manchester's
power of eminent domain in St. Louis County v. City of Manchester.s Just
as in Askew, the municipal intruding unit was attempting to establish a
sewage treatment plant in the county host unit. The vital difference in
Manchester was that the county, as a constitutional home rule charter
county, had constitutional authority for its zoning laws. 29
In Manchester, the county sought an injunction against construction
of the sewage facility.3 0 The city relied on both Ferriss and Askew as
authority for its actions based on its power of eminent domain.3 ' The court
distinguished both cases. Ferriss was differentiated on the ground that
Manchester's grant of the power of eminent domain did not give it the
right to select the precise location for its sewage plant, but the nature of
schools required that the Ladue School Board in Ferriss locate schools
where they would best serve the public interest.32 Askew was distinguished
on the basis of two factual differences: Jackson County was not a home rule
charter county, and the objectors were private landowners and not the
county.33 The public interest was also a factor in the Manchester decision.
The court did not foreclose the city's power to build the plant, but re-
quired it to work within the county's zoning laws in its selection of a site. In
25. The court observed that no zoning authority is grounded in the Missouri
Constitution except that granted to home rule charter counties. 330 S.W.2d at
887 n.2. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
26. Askew has been cited as a leading case decided under the eminent do-
main test. See Lincoln County v. Johnson, - S.D. -, - 257 N.W.2d
453, 456 (1977); Annot., supra note 14, at 1266; Note, supra note 10, at 874.
27. 330 S.W.2d at 889.
28. 360 S.W.2d 638 (Mo. En Banc 1962).
29. Id. at 641. See MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) (amended 1976).
30. The city had neither received nor applied for a building permit as re-
quired by the county zoning law. 360 S.W.2d at 639.
31. Manchester cited the same authorities as used by the court in Askew. Id.
at 640. See note 24 supra.
32. 360 S.W.2d at 640-41. See also Comment, supra note 12, at 324-25.
33. In fact, in Askew the Jackson County Board of Adjustment had granted
permission for the sewage plant construction. 330 S.W.2d at 884. A survey of the
zoning immunity cases reveals that the antagonists usually are both governmental
entities, but the outcome seems to be unaffected when private landowners seek to
enforce the zoning laws. See generally Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game
Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 576 P.2d 230 (1978) (private landowners obtained
injunction against state agency based on county zoning regulations).
464 [Vol. 46
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this respect, the Manchester court's reasoning reflects the analysis required
by the balancing of public interests test. 34
In Appelbaum v. St. Louis County,3 5 private citizens and the
municipality of Bel-Ridge by cross petition sought an injunction to prevent
the county from constructing a landfill within the city limits of Bel-Ridge
and St. John in contravention of their municipal zoning ordinances. 36 The
same provision of the constitution37 which the county relied on in Man-
chester was relied on here to sustain the county's authority to build the
landfill. The court held that the county was not subject to the municipal
zoning ordinances, and relied on Ferriss. In so doing the court returned to
the county's constitutionally granted power of eminent domain and the
lack of an express statutory or constitutional grant to the municipality of
power to restrict the county's exercise of eminent domain.3 8
The last zoning immunity case to come before Missouri appellate
courts prior to Kirkwood was State ex rel. City of Gower v. Gee.39 Factu-
ally, it is very similar to Askew; the city of Gower applied for an exception
to Buchanan County's zoning laws in order to build a sewage treatment
facility on land it had purchased there. The Missouri Court of Appeals for
the Western District affirmed the lower court's reversal of the county's
denial of the exception. Both Appelbaum and Manchester were
distinguished because they each dealt with a constitutional charter county.
Askew was declared to be precisely in point and controlling.40
If there is any consistency, the Missouri decisions may be illustrative of
what one commentator has called a "sub rosa judicial interest
balancing," 41 i.e., an underlying consideration of the reasonableness of
the intruding unit's actions weighed against the host unit's interest in land
use control.4 2 The balancing of public interests test merely calls for such
34. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
35. 451 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. 1970).
36. In addition to the claim that the landfill would violate the
municipalities' zoning regulations, the objectors alleged that the county's actions
were arbitrary and capricious. The court said that "an ordinance of the legislative
body . . . is cloaked with a presumption of validity." 451 S.W.2d at 114. See
McMurry v. Kansas City, 283 Mo. 479, 492-93, 223 S.W. 615, 619 (En Banc
1920). See also Comment, supra note 10, at 711-13 (discussing host unit's possible
arguments that the intruding unit's actions are an abuse of discretion or will
create a nuisance).
37. 451 S.W.2d at 109. See MO. CONST. art. VI, § 18(c) (amended 1976).
38. The municipality's zoning authority was based on RSMO § 89.020
(1969) (now 1978). 451 S.W.2d at 113.
39. 573 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
40. Id. at 112.
41. Note, supra note 10, at 873.
42. See 360 S.W.2d at 640 ("St. Louis County does not undertake to forbid
or prohibit altogether the construction of a sewage disposal plant ... but con-
1981]
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activity to be carried on openly and frankly. 4s For this reason the eastern
district court of appeals expressed a strong interest in adoption of this
mode of analysis in the Kirkwood decision. 4 4
The balancing of public interests test gained an increasing number of
adherents during the 1970s.4 ' The reasons for this following are several.
One prevalent concern is the fear of abuse that could attend the grant of
absolute immunity from local zoning regulations, such immunity being
grounded on what is frequently equal statutory authority and not
necessarily on a disinterested concern for the best interests of both govern-
mental entities. 46 It also has been said that to base zoning immunity on a
mechanical test is to elevate form over substance. 47 Most persuasive is the
argument that in today's modem world of urban sprawl, land use planning
and control has gained increasing importance, and should not be dis-
missed without careful thought and justification. 48 It appears only
reasonable to require an intruding governmental unit to try to work within
its host unit's zoning regulations, and attempt to arrive at a cooperative
resolution of the conflict based on the needs of both entities. 49
Under the traditional tests, once the court determines that the in-
truding unit has the superior authority, the zoning regulations of the host
unit are declared a fortiori inapplicable to the intruding unit's activities.5 0
tends that the location and construction... must be made in conformity with the
county's laws and ordinances ....").
43. See Note, supra note 10, at 884.
44. 589 S.W.2d at 43.
45. See cases cited note 8 supra.
46. As the court said in Manchester, "It is unlikely.., that the city would
undertake to construct such a facility in a residential portion of its own city." 360
S.W.2d at 642. See Orange County v. City of Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d 694, 700
(N.D. 1977).
47. Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish & Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102,
112, 576 P.2d 230, 238 (1978); Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn.
468, 471, 197 N.W.2d 426, 429 (1972).
48. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
Inc., 322 So. 2d 571, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), affd, 332 So.2d 610 (Fla.
1976); Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 471, 197 N.W.2d
426, 429 (1972); Lincoln County v. Johnson, - S.D .... 257 N.W.2d
453, 457 (1977).
49. Courts in two jurisdictions have specifically declined to adopt the bal-
ancing of public interests test. Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward,
196 Neb. 266, 276, 242 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1976) ("while such a rule may have its
merits and advantages, it also has its disadvantages because of lack of guidelines
for its operation and increased difficulties of application"); South Hill Sewer Dist.
v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. App. 738, 743, 591 P.2d 877, 880 (1979) (eminent
domain test proper in light of legislative intent as expressed by applicable
statutes).
50. See, e.g., City of Scottsdale v. Municipal Court, 90 Ariz. 393, 397, 368
P.2d 637, 639 (1962); Decatur Park Dist. v. Becker, 368 Ill. 442, 447, 14 N.E.2d
466 [Vol. 46
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The intruding unit need not make application for variances or exceptions,
and presumably need not even consult with the host unit's officials as to its
plans. In Missouri, when the cities of Cower and Raytown did attempt to
work with the host unit's zoning agencies, those agencies' actions were later
declared coram nonjudice by the courts. 5 1
Under the balancing of public interests test the host unit's zoning
regulations are presumed valid. The intruding unit is required to comply
with the zoning agency's procedures by applying for a variance or excep-
tion or requesting that an area be rezoned. 52 The burden of proof is on the
intruding unit to justify the selection of the particular site for its landfill,
airport, sewage facility, or whatever the nonconforming use might be. 53
Shifting the burden of proof forces the intruding unit to consider carefully
all possible sites, and enhances the chance that more responsible land use
decisions will result.
This is not to say that the intruding unit is foreclosed from establishing
its nonconforming use if the host unit refuses to compromise. The
dissatisfied governmental entity always then has access to the courts. One
commentator, the originator of the balancing of public interests concept,
has suggested a number of factors which a court should consider in such a
case:
1. Is there any statutory guidance as to which interest should
prevail? Does the statute explicitly authorize immunity or does it
merely direct a particular governmental unit to perform a certain
function without mentioning any possible exemption from local
zoning regulation?
2. Do the zoning ordinance and any other manifestation of
490, 493 (1938); Appelbaum v. St. Louis County, 451 S.W.2d 107, 113 (Mo.
1970); State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Mo. 1960); Congrega-
tion Temple Israel v. City of Creve Coeur, 320 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Mo. 1959); State
ex rel. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Ferriss, 304 S.W.2d 896, 903 (Mo. En Banc
1957); City of Kirkwood v. City of Sunset Hills, 589 S.W.2d 31, 43 (Mo. App.,
E.D. 1979); State ex rel. City of Cower v. Gee, 573 S.W.2d 107, 112 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1978); Seward County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Seward, 196 Neb. 266,
277, 242 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1976); South Hill Sewer Dist. v. Pierce County, 22
Wash. App. 738, 747, 591 P.2d 877, 882 (1979); Comment, supra note 10, at
699.
51. State ex rel. Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882, 890 (Mo. 1960); State ex
rel. City of Gower v. Gee, 573 S.W.2d 107, 112 (Mo. App., K.C. 1978).
52. See Comment, supra note 12, at 326-28.
53. City of Temple Terrace v. Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded Citizens,
Inc., 322 So. 2d 571, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), affd, 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla.
1976) (state home for the mentally retarded); Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish &
Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 113-14, 576 P.2d 230, 238 (1978) (public
parking lot in subdivision); City of Fargo v. Harwood Township, 256 N.W.2d
694, 698 (N.D. 1977) (sanitary landfill); Lincoln County v. Johnson, - S.D.
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the local planning process comprehend alternative locations for
the facility?
3. Did the governmental unit consider alternative locations
for the facility?
4. What is the scope of the political authority of the govern-
mental unit performing the function relative to the body in-
stituting the zoning ordinance?
5. Has there been any independent supervisory review of the
proposed facility by a governmental unit of 'higher' authority such
as a state-wide planning commission? Was this review designed by
statute to be exclusive?
6. How essential is the facility to the local community? To
the broader community?
7. How detrimental is the proposed facility to the surround-
ing property?
8. Has the governmental unit made reasonable attempts to
minimize the detriment to the adjacent landowners' use and enjoy-
ment of their property?
9. Has there been any attempt to comply with the zoning
procedure for obtaining an amendment or a variance? Have the
adversely affected landowners been given an opportunity to pre-
sent their objections to the proper nonjudicial authorities?"4
Only if a court decides on the basis of all these considerations that the host
government's refusal to amend or grant exception is unreasonable should
the regulation be declared inapplicable.
Adoption of the balancing of public interests test, as suggested by the
Kirkwood court, would not result in any radical change in Missouri deci-
sional law. Compliance with legislative intent is the underpinning of the
various analyses presently used by the courts. Although legislative intent is
only one factor to be considered by the court under the balancing test,
where that intent is clear it still should be determinative, as the courts
always must defer to clear legislative intent, unless that intent is un-
constitutional. Where there is no clear intent, however, the balancing test
would foster reasonable land use control and encourage an appraisal of the
needs and objections of both governmental entities. With no explicit
legislative mandate to the contrary, the dicta in Kirkwood recommending
adoption of the balancing of public interests test should be followed.
SHARON K. WEEDIN
54. Note, supra note 10, at 883-84. See also Rutgers v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142,
153, 286 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1972).
It has been suggested that the final arbiter of intergovernmental zotiing con-
flicts should be an independent statewide planning agency vested with the
authority to review such cases. See Note, supra note 10, at 882. The method
worked out by the courts, however, whereby the zoning laws are presumed valid
and the intruding entity works with the host's zoning authorities would seem to
provide an adequate remedy without creation of another state agency.
[Vol. 46468
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